Raw 802.11 frame injection on ESP-IDF v5.x / v6.x. A one-command, reversible patch that re-enables the full set of 802.11 frame types (Authentication, Deauth, Assoc, Reassoc, Disassoc, RTS/CTS/ACK, …) for transmission via esp_wifi_80211_tx(), which Espressif's shipped libnet80211.a restricts to a short whitelist (Beacon, Probe Req/Resp, Action, non-QoS Data).

Includes:

• The patch itself (patch/patch_libnet80211.sh) — objcopy --weaken-symbol on one symbol, with backup and --revert.
• A minimal demo firmware (example/) that injects five frame variants and reports results over serial.
• Pcap, Hostapd log, and serial-log evidence that the patch enables SAE Commit (Authentication subtype 11) injection on ESP32 — the motivating use case for this work.
• The full engineering writeup as a research paper (docs/esp32_raw_tx_report.pdf).

Earlier community projects (wsl_bypasser, esp32-wifi-penetration-tool, Atomic-SAQuery, …) relied on a strong-C-symbol override of the blob function ieee80211_raw_frame_sanity_check. That technique silently stopped working around ESP-IDF v5: the blob symbol's binding changed from WEAK to STRONG, so the override now fails at link time with a multiple-definition error.

The obvious fallback (-Wl,--wrap=ieee80211_raw_frame_sanity_check) also silently fails: GNU ld --wrap only rewrites undefined, inter-object references, but the call that matters — esp_wifi_80211_tx → sanity_check — is intra-object inside ieee80211_output.o, invisible to --wrap.

This repo documents the breaking change and ships a working alternative: flip the blob symbol back to WEAK with objcopy --weaken-symbol, then provide the override in app code. Global strong-beats-weak resolution rebinds every reference, including the intra-object one.

See docs/esp32_raw_tx_report.pdf for the complete engineering trace including disassembly of the frame-type whitelist, three failed attempts, and end-to-end verification evidence.

# Assumes IDF is at $IDF_PATH. Override with LIBNET80211=... if needed.
bash patch/patch_libnet80211.sh

# Verify (should print "W" after; "T" means not patched)
xtensa-esp32-elf-nm $IDF_PATH/components/esp_wifi/lib/esp32/libnet80211.a \
    | grep ieee80211_raw_frame_sanity_check
#   0000005c W ieee80211_raw_frame_sanity_check    ← correct

The patch is idempotent; running it again is a no-op. To revert:

bash patch/patch_libnet80211.sh --revert

A backup of the original archive is saved as libnet80211.a.bak on first run.

cd example
idf.py set-target esp32
idf.py build flash monitor

Serial output should cycle through five variants every 4 s, each reporting esp_wifi_80211_tx() -> ESP_OK:

I (xxxxx) INJ-DEMO: >>> Sending V0 Deauth (control)            esp_wifi_80211_tx() -> ESP_OK
I (xxxxx) INJ-DEMO: >>> Sending V1 Open-Auth (baseline)        esp_wifi_80211_tx() -> ESP_OK
I (xxxxx) INJ-DEMO: >>> Sending V2 SAE-Commit bare             esp_wifi_80211_tx() -> ESP_OK
I (xxxxx) INJ-DEMO: >>> Sending V3 SAE-Commit full (malformed) esp_wifi_80211_tx() -> ESP_OK
I (xxxxx) INJ-DEMO: >>> Sending V4 SAE-Commit valid (scalar=2,E=G)
                                                               esp_wifi_80211_tx() -> ESP_OK

If instead you see E (xxxxx) wifi:unsupport frame type: 0b0 on every cycle, the patch did not take; re-run patch_libnet80211.sh and idf.py fullclean build flash.

Point another Wi-Fi adapter in monitor mode on the same channel and run tcpdump / Wireshark. See evidence/ for an example capture.

Table from the research paper (Table 1):

• Downstream constraints still apply. The patch only removes the sanity_check gate. The MAC hardware, MLME state machine, and TX scheduler still apply their own restrictions. In practice this means mgmt frames inject reliably; control frames (RTS/CTS/ACK) get sent but may be too user-space-late for proper IEEE 802.11 timing (SIFS deadline). For content fuzzing, timing doesn't matter; for protocol-conforming interactions, it does.
• This modifies the ESP-IDF install globally. Every project you build against that IDF will link against the patched archive. patch_libnet80211.sh --revert restores the stock file from backup.
• TX bypass only. This does nothing to RX — monitor-mode promiscuous capture works out of the box in ESP-IDF.
• Tested on ESP-IDF v6.1-dev against ESP32 (classic). Should work on v5.x and other targets (ESP32-S2/S3/C-series) if the symbol binding is T — check with nm first, see the "Verify" step above.

The techniques here enable raw 802.11 frame transmission, which has both research/defensive uses (fuzzing, PMF testing, side-channel measurement — the motivating use case) and adversarial uses (deauth storms against networks you don't own). Only operate against Wi-Fi networks and devices you own or have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized operation against third-party infrastructure is illegal in most jurisdictions.

The author uses this patch inside an isolated laboratory environment at NHSM, Algiers, for a Master's thesis on WPA3-SAE side-channel analysis.

.
├── README.md                            — this file
├── LICENSE                              — MIT
├── patch/
│   └── patch_libnet80211.sh             — the patch script
├── example/                             — minimal demo IDF project
│   ├── CMakeLists.txt
│   └── main/
│       ├── CMakeLists.txt
│       └── main.c
├── docs/
│   └── esp32_raw_tx_report.pdf          — full engineering writeup
└── evidence/
    ├── README.md                        — what each file proves
    ├── sae_injection_first_capture.pcap — monitor-mode OTA capture
    ├── tshark_injected_frames.txt       — decoded frame list
    ├── hostapd_v4_roundtrip.log         — Hostapd parse + response
    └── serial_log_post_bypass.txt       — ESP32 serial, no reject log

• risinek/wsl_bypasser — the original same-name-override approach. Works on IDF ≤ v4.x; silently breaks on v5+ as documented here.
• risinek/esp32-wifi-penetration-tool — depends on wsl_bypasser; same limitation.
• Matheus-Garbelini/esp32_esp8266_attacks — academic CVE PoCs, limited to beacon-only injection.
• Vanhoef & Ronen, Dragonblood: Analyzing the Dragonfly Handshake of WPA3 and EAP-pwd, IEEE S&P 2020 — the SAE PWE side-channel that motivates this project.

If you use this patch or the writeup in academic work, please cite:

Mehdi Mansour. "Enabling Raw 802.11 Management Frame Injection on
ESP-IDF v6: A Linker-Level Analysis of ieee80211_raw_frame_sanity_check
and a Reproducible Bypass." Technical report, École Nationale
Supérieure de Mathématiques (NHSM), Algiers, October 2026.

Mehdi Mansour — Dept. of Cryptography, Coding and Security, NHSM Algiers. Contact: mahdi.mansour@nhsm.edu.dz · LinkedIn

MIT. See LICENSE.