A Python port of Group3r — the Group Policy auditing tool by @mikeloss — that authenticates with impacket so it runs from Linux, plus a filterable single-file HTML report on top of the original output formats.

The goal is identical findings: the same finding reasons, details, triage levels and suppression behaviour as the C# original, from the same GPO data.

See a full example report — download and open it locally; GitHub serves HTML as plain text.

Group3r is excellent but assumes a domain-joined Windows host. This port targets the common engagement setup — a Linux box with credentials — and addresses the practical problem that its text reports reach hundreds of megabytes in large environments, which is effectively unsearchable.

python3 -m pip install impacket pycryptodomex
# for the test suite:
python3 -m pip install pytest playwright && python3 -m playwright install chromium

Python 3.12+. Runtime dependencies are impacket and pycryptodomex only; the HTML report has no external dependencies at all.

# Online, password auth, with the HTML report
python3 -m group3rpy -d corp.local --username jbloggs -p 'Passw0rd!' \
    --dc-ip 10.0.0.10 -s --html report.html

# Pass-the-hash
python3 -m group3rpy -d corp.local --username jbloggs \
    -H :2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe --dc-ip 10.0.0.10 -s

# Kerberos from an existing ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=jbloggs.ccache
python3 -m group3rpy -d corp.local -k --dc-ip 10.0.0.10 -s

# With blast-radius resolution and a BloodHound edge export
python3 -m group3rpy -d corp.local --username jbloggs -p 'Passw0rd!' \
    --dc-ip 10.0.0.10 -s --scope --html report.html --bloodhound edges

# Offline against a SYSVOL copy (no DC needed)
python3 -m group3rpy -o -y /mnt/sysvol -s --html report.html

# Only findings, Red and above, to a file
python3 -m group3rpy -d corp.local --username jbloggs -p 'Passw0rd!' \
    -w -a 3 -f group3r.txt

Everything from the original is preserved verbatim, including flag letters and the --verobsity spelling. Run -h for the full list. Original flags:

Additions for this port:

-u keeps its original meaning (--testuser), so the username flag is long-only rather than impacket's usual -u.

Every finding carries a what this is / how it is abused / how to fix it block, and the ACL table flags ACEs that hand write-equivalent control to a principal that is not already domain-privileged:

--html report.html writes one self-contained file — no external scripts, styles or fonts, so it is safe to hand to a client and works offline.

Filtering

• Triage pills (Black / Red / Yellow / Green, plus None for settings with no finding)
• Facets for finding type, policy scope (Computer / User / Package) and GPO, each with counts and a search box for the GPO list
• Sortable columns
• Export the current filtered set to CSV or JSON

Search supports more than substrings:

Multiple terms are ANDed. / focuses search, j/k move, Esc closes the detail pane. The page follows the OS light/dark setting.

Why it stays fast and small. Strings are interned so each distinct finding reason is stored once; filterable fields live in parallel integer arrays; the payload is gzipped and inflated in the browser; and rows are virtualised so the DOM holds only what is on screen. Search is evaluated against the interned string dictionary rather than the rows, so its cost scales with vocabulary size, not finding count. In practice this is roughly 6 bytes per finding row, so a report that runs to hundreds of MB as flat text lands in the low single-digit MB.

Group3r tells you a GPO is linked to OU=Workstations,DC=corp,DC=local. It never tells you that this means 412 specific servers — or nothing at all. That distinction is most of triage: a Black finding on an unlinked GPO is noise.

--scope resolves it, via LDAP:

• gPLink parsing including the per-link status bits (1 = disabled, 2 = enforced)
• gPOptions block-inheritance — which Group3r actually requests and then throws away
• enforced links, which correctly flow past a block-inheritance boundary
• the full container tree, including plain containers like CN=Computers that cannot hold a link but still inherit
• security filtering, via the Apply Group Policy extended right, so a GPO filtered to one group isn't reported as hitting every machine under its link
• WMI filters and site links, reported as "scope may be narrower" and "unresolved" rather than silently ignored

It deliberately does not claim precedence — which GPO wins for a given value depends on link-order semantics this port does not assert. Blast radius only needs set membership, and a wrong precedence claim would be worse than none.

In the HTML report this adds a Reach column, reach-bucket facets (1000+, 101-1000, …, 0 computers, links disabled, not linked), "only show" toggles for enforced / security-filtered / WMI-filtered, sorting by reach, and computer: and container: search fields — so "every Red finding that touches more than 100 machines" is two clicks. Scope also lands in the CSV and JSON exports.

Nothing here touches the nice or json printers, so parity is unaffected.

Derives attack-path edges from GPO settings, scoped to the machines each GPO actually reaches:

• AdminTo, CanRDP, CanPSRemote from members added to the corresponding built-in local groups
• GPOLocalGroupMember for other privileged local groups (Backup / Print / Server / Account Operators, Distributed COM Users) — not relabelled as AdminTo
• GPOGrantsPrivilege from privilege rights, marked adminEquivalent where the ported classification table says the right is a local privesc
• GPOServiceAccount and GPOScheduledTaskPrincipal from service and task principals

It writes files, not database changes: <prefix>.json (OpenGraph-shaped) and <prefix>.cypher. The Cypher uses MERGE, never CREATE, so re-running does not duplicate edges; it MATCHes principals and computers rather than MERGEing them, so it cannot invent phantom nodes; provenance (source='group3rpy', GPO guid) is written under ON CREATE SET only, so the commented-out rollback query at the top of the file cannot delete edges BloodHound genuinely collected. Read it before you run it.

GPOs that cannot apply (orphaned, all links disabled, computer policy disabled) produce zero edges. Where scope is uncertain (security or WMI filtering) edges are still emitted but carry uncertain: true and a reason.

The OpenGraph JSON schema is shaped from documentation, not verified against a running BloodHound. Check it against your version; the writer is one small function if it needs adjusting. The .cypher file does not depend on it.

All detection logic, finding text and rule tables are the work of the Group3r authors — @mikeloss and contributors — and of the Snaffler project whose classifier engine Group3r embeds. This is a port; the judgement about what makes a GPO misconfiguration interesting is theirs.

Upstream: https://github.com/Group3r/Group3r

Upstream Group3r is GPL v3 (upstream/LICENSE). This port is a derivative work and is therefore also GPL v3 — including the finding text, rule tables and detection logic it carries over. If you redistribute it, the GPL's source requirements apply.